Introduction
The [2007] [2008] [2009] Great Recession left behind a dramatic legacy: creeping growth and high longterm unemployment rates, a devastated banking sector and huge public debts. Three years later, Euro area countries are facing the worst di¢ culties. Financial instability and poor growth are now compounding their e¤ects in the most disruptive way. With ECB target interest rate close to zero, several economists echoed by many EU political leaders argue that only a massive …scal stimulus can revigorate the weakest economies. The basic rationale behind this view builds on traditional Keynesian reasoning: low (short-term) interest rates combined with a depressed economy signal an excess of savings over investment opportunities; in this context, a higher public spending and the connected de…cit should not push up interest rates, but stimulate growth (Krugman, 2010) .
The Keynesian policy framework was developed under the assumption that bonds and money are perfect substitutes; in particular, bonds were seen as the risk-free asset. The contemporary DSGE new Keynesian macroeconomics also builds on the assumption that the central bank can maintain short and long-term interest rates on a pre-committed schedule (see Woodford, 2010 ).
Yet these days are gone. Public debt is no longer seen as the perfect hedge against …nancial risks, in particular in Euro area countries where the central bank cannot monetize public debt.
1 If the public debt is too high, small increases in this debt, triggered by …scal stimulation of the economy, might bring about large variations in risk-adjusted interest rates. The culprit is the illiquidity risk: if investors lose con…dence in a government and refuse to hold its debt, the debt service increases and pushes the debt on an unsustainable path.
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As an example, in 2011 and 2012, Italy, one of the four largest Euro area economies, has seen yields on 10-year Treasury bonds crossing the 7% line for several times although it is running primary surpluses. Furthermore, in "high-risk" countries, risk premia on public and corporate debt are highly correlated (IMF, 2012) .
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In turn, higher corporate interest rates would entail the crowding-out of private investment. If the "…nancial crowding-out" e¤ect takes over the direct public spending e¤ect, the spending multiplier can be much smaller than one and even become negative.
In this paper, we aim to provide an analysis of the spending multiplier that takes into account the …nancial risk associated to large public debts. After introducing a spending multiplier that incorporates an additional "…nancial crowding-out" e¤ect, we study the relationship between public spending, growth and public debt using a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011.
Both growth and the growth e¤ect of a …scal stimulus appear to be weaker in high-debt countries.
Furthermore, the …scal multiplier turns negative if the public debt raises above 150% of the GDP (with a lower bound of 108% at the 95% con…dence level).
Recently several empirical papers have investigated the relationship between growth and debt in the long run. For instance Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) analyze data on forty-four countries over two hundred years. The show that the median growth rate is lower by one percentage point in countries/periods where the debt-to-GDP is above 90% as compared to countries/periods where the debt-to-GDP is below 90%. Kumar and Woo (2010) analyze a panel of advanced and emerging economies over four years; they reveal a relationship between initial debt and growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in initial debt-to GDP is associated to a slowdown in annual real par capita GDP growth of 0.2 percentage point per year. Similar results were obtained for euro area countries; Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and Baum et al. (2012) show that a debtto-GDP ratio above 90-100% brings about a negative impact on growth rates. There is no explicit model of for this negative relationship between growth and debt, but, as noticed by Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012, p.9) , who reviewed this empirical literature, "high debt is expected to result in lower growth because of crowding-out e¤ects on private investment".
The paper is organized as follows. We …rstly introduce a simple analysis of the spending multiplier that incorporates the …nancial crowding out e¤ect. In the second part, we use data for EU countries in the 1996-2011 period, to gauge the impact of debt on both growth rates and the 2 e¤ectiveness of …scal policy. The last section presents the conclusion.
2 Theory: the "augmented" spending multiplier
We start with the textbook IS condition:
( 1) where Y stands for the national income, c is the marginal propensity to consume (constant), with c < 1, T are taxes as a function of income, with dT =dY = T Y < 1; and G denotes public spending.
The public de…cit is DEF = G T (Y ): Private investment I is is represented as a function of i, the interest rate on corporate projects, with dI=di = I i < 0. The price level is assumed to be constant and in ‡ation expectations are zero.
Let us denote by the (subjective) probability of default on the public debt and by the risk-free interest rate (constant). Without losing much explanatory power, we can assume that in the event of default the debt residual value is zero (i.e., the haircut is 100%). With risk-neutral investors, the no-trade o¤ condition implies a risk-adjusted interest rate on public debt r de…ned by:
It turns out that the risk-adjusted interest rate on public debt is a convex, increasing function in the subjective default probability ; r = r( ): We admit that this probability is an increasing function in the debt level D and the de…cit DEF , = F (D; DEF ); with @ =@D = F 1 (; ) > 0; and
We further assume that the cross derivative @ 2 =@D@DEF = F 12 (; ) > 0 : this assumption is quite plausible: if the debt is high, chances that a higher de…cit pushes the debt out of the sustainable path should increase, and vice-versa.
In Europe, many corporations depend on public orders, subsidies and state guarantees. Under imperfect information, many investors use the country risk as a proxy for corporate risk, in particular for small, non listed …rms. Furthermore, the best risk rating of companies is in general 3 capped by the country rating; when a rating agency downgrades a country, the average cost of capital for corporations edges up (IMF 2012, p 39).
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Hence, we can assume that the interest rate on corporate debt and interest rates on public debt are strongly correlated, more precisely, we assume that risk-adjusted corporate interest rate can be represented as an increasing function in r; denoted i = i(r).
Given this chain of e¤ects, we can write the corporate interest rate as an increasing function in the public debt and the de…cit:
with ' 1 > 0; ' 2 > 0; ' 12 > 0; properties that result from properties of the F function.
A …scal stimulus dG > 0 brings about an impact on de…cit,
Since the variation in the debt is dD = DEF; a variation in de…cit has only a second order e¤ect (positive) on the debt that we will neglect.
Then, by di¤erentiating the equilibrium condition (1):
we get the "augmented" public spending multiplier as:
The properties of the multiplier are easy to study:
If we compare with the elementary multiplier m = [1 c (1 T Y )] 1 ; it can be easily checked that < m: This is the direct consequence of the "…nancial crowding-out e¤ect".
Furthermore, if m is allays larger than one, can be smaller than one (and even negative) if the crowding out e¤ect is strong enough, which in turn depends on the response of investment to i; and the response of corporate interest rate to public debt changes: < 1 , c < (
Given the ' 12 > 0 assumption, we have d =dD < 0 : the larger the debt, the bigger the impact of a …scal stimulus on interest rate, and the more powerful is the crowding-out e¤ect.
The purpose of this elementary analysis was to emphasize the …nancial crowding-out e¤ect that can prevail when the debt-to-GDP ratio gets closer to the unsustainability limit, given investors' subjective assessment of the risk of default. The unsustainability limit has not been de…ned here, 
Empirical analysis
The European Union is made up of 27 countries in 2011. The EU-27 debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 69.9% in 1996 to 82.5% in 2011, with a strong acceleration after 2007. Only six out of the 26 countries in our sample managed to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. The Appendix provides a summary of the data. Besides the 11 founding members who created the Euro in 1999, six other countries joined the club later on. In the light of our analysis, this is an important institutional change insofar as at that moment they become more vulnerable to the illiquidity risk. In the second semester of 2012 the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 90.0%, compared to 71.6% at the creation of the European Monetary Union in 1999.
We estimate a growth equation, using panel on 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011; we excluded Luxemburg given its special status and small population size. Denoting by GROW T H it -the annual real growth rate of country i at time t; in percentage points; DEF it -the public de…cit as a percentage of GDP of country i at time t; DEBT it -public 4 Including Luxemburg does not change the results.
5 debt as a percentage of GDP of country i at time t; and DU M EM U -a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is member of the Euro area, the growth equation is:
where u i is a country speci…c residual and it is the "usual" residual. The coe¢ cient a 2 applies to an interaction term between debt and de…cit.
We estimate equation (6) using both random and …xed-e¤ect panel data estimators. The panel is strongly balanced; there are 405 observations (4 observations are missing for Greece (de…cit, 1996-2001) , 4 observations for Malta (growth, 1996-2001) and one observation is missing for Bulgaria in 1996). Table 1 presents the output of the estimation.
Coe¢ cients FE Coe¢ cients RE Table 1 . Output Estimates of the Growth Equation (*** = signi…cant at 1%; * = signi…cant at 10%)
A Hausman test suggests that we can rely on the …xed-e¤ect model to properly represent the country-level e¤ects; for the sake of comparison we also provide the output estimate of the 6 random-e¤ect model.
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The regression model provides several interesting insights, in particular if we write the …tted growth equation (6) as:
GROW T H it = 6:64 0:028DEBT it + 0:006 (148 DEBT it ) DEF it 2:103DU M EM U it (7)
All things equal, a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio would bring down the growth rate by 0.28 percentage point on average, a …gure in line with the …ndings by Kumar and Woo (2010) .
In line with textbook Keynesian wisdom, if the debt-to-GDP is relatively low -here, below 148% (as calculated as the ratio of …tted coe¢ cient a 0 =a 2 ) -larger de…cits (and higher spending) are associated to higher growth rates in the year when they occur. Hall (2009) reviewed the empirical evidence for the US and concluded that, under normal circumstances, GDP rises by roughly the amount of an increase in government purchases. According our estimates, this would happen in the EU region only if the debt-to-GDP ratio would be close to zero.
Above the critical threshold of 148% debt-to-GDP, the impact of a positive de…cit on growth rates turns negative. Notice that the 95% con…dence interval for this critical debt-to-GDP is as large as [108; 201] .
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Notice also that the Euro area dummy seems to have a dramatic impact on growth. In other words, EU countries outside the Euro-area tend to outperform Euro member countries.
Of course, all these estimates should be interpreted with caution since they build essentially on linear relationships between the variables. The theoretical model has emphasized that the risk 5 The Breusch and Pagan LM test indicates that the RE e¤ect model is better than the pooled OLS estimator. 6 The con…dence interval of the ratio between the …tted coe¢ cients is calculated with the Stata routine indicated at www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2010-04/msg00429.html premium and the interest rate might edge up very strongly if investors believe that the debt gets closer to the sustainablity threshold.
Conclusion
Whether …scal stimulus can foster growth or not, it depends to a large extent on the response of long-term interest rates and the strength of the crowding-out e¤ect on private investment.
In this paper, we argue that the interest rate response depends on investors' assessment of the government's …nancial stability. For very large public debts, a positive de…cit and additional debt might entail a substantial rise in interest rates and a very powerful crowding-out e¤ect that can o¤set the direct e¤ect of additional spending.
We back this rationale with empirical evidence on 26 European economies over the 1996-2011 period, which includes post-recession high-debt years. It turns out that a large public debt not only has an adverse e¤ect on growth, but also reduces the positive e¤ect of a given …scal stimulus.
More in detail, if the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a critical threshold with a central value of 148%, the spending multiplier would become negative.
Policy implications are straightforward. For low public debt EU countries, …scal policy can be an interesting tool, to be used with cautiously. However, if high-debt European economies want to stimulate growth, the most e¢ cient solutions lie on the structural reforms side.
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